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What kind of papers does Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR) publish? 
Does CGIR publish only empirical papers or also accept conceptual ones? Is my study suitable for 
publication in CGIR? These are typical questions we receive from scholars who are considering 
submitting a paper to the journal and want to have a better understanding of its mission and scope. 
The editors’ responsibilities obviously include answering these --- and other --- questions from 
potential submitters, along with continually improving the journal’s website so that it becomes a 
useful tool for the editorial team, the authors, and the readers of the journal.  
We have decided to write this editorial to help address the persistent requests for more 
details on the style of the journal. In particular, we focus on the various types (or formats) of papers 
that CGIR welcomes. As stated in the authors’ guidelines, CGIR solicits six different types of 
articles: (i) empirical, (ii) conceptual, (iii) review, (iv) perspective, (v) commentary and, from this 
issue onward, (vi) point and counterpoint. We now provide more details and information on each 
format. 
(i) Empirical studies published in CGIR should aim at constructing or testing theories 
about the antecedents or the consequences of corporate governance mechanisms and processes. 
CGIR particularly encourages the submission of multi-country studies because they often generate 
interesting international corporate governance insights; however, we also welcome single-country 
studies if sufficient new insights on the underlying theory and/or empirical methodology are 
generated. This means that the study should explain if the results can hold across several types or 
categories of governance systems, or if they are affected strongly by some national institutions, 
and/or provide significant new methods related innovations regarding the empirical testing of 
international corporate governance theories. We solicit both quantitative method papers aimed at 
testing theoretical hypotheses about the relationships between key constructs, and qualitative 
method studies aimed at building new theoretical insights (Zattoni, Douglas, Judge 2013). In both 
cases, empirical studies should be characterized by a rigorous data collection and analysis in order 
to reach the publication standards of the journal. Most of the studies submitted to CGIR are in fact 
empirical studies and, consequently, they are the most frequently published format. For example, in 
volume 20 (2012), 28 out of 32 articles published were empirical studies. 
(ii) Conceptual articles are aimed at developing new theoretical insights and relationships 
regarding the antecedents or the consequences of corporate governance mechanisms and processes. 
These articles develop theoretical frameworks and propositions that can be empirically tested. The 
new theoretical insights can be generated in several ways, e.g. by combining different theoretical 
insights, by exploring logical paradoxes in the literature, by challenging existing theories (like the 
dominant agency theory), or by synthesizing recent insights into a new theory.  Conceptual studies 
– like the empirical ones – should explain in which governance systems the new theoretical insights 
can apply and/or how national institutions affect them. But even though CGIR welcomes conceptual 
papers, we receive few such conceptual papers, and only very few of them reach the publication 
stage because the submitted studies often tend to be purely descriptive and do not provide a strong 
theoretical contribution. For this reason, it is not surprising that only one conceptual paper has been 
published in 2012 (i.e. Cuevas-Rodriguez, Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman, 2012). 
(iii) Review articles are aimed at summarizing a stream of research on a specific topic, 
identifying gaps in the literature, and highlighting the most promising directions for future studies. 
Review articles should go beyond a mere synthesis of the literature, they should analyse the various 
theoretical frameworks applied and the set of empirical methods adopted, and – based on a careful 
and detailed analysis – should identify gaps and help scholars to develop future research agenda. 
Again, although CGIR welcomes review studies, the journal does not receive many of these and 
publishes just a few of them. As a result, in 2012, the journal published only one review article that  
investiged the editorial process and decisions at CGIR (Zattoni and Van Ees, 2012). 
(iv) Perspective articles are aimed at challenging the existing theoretical, methodological or 
practical paradigms in corporate governance literature. Scholars are invited to present their own 
perspective on corporate governance building on literature, logic, empirical and also anecdotal 
evidence. Perspective articles should be supported by a sound logic and empirical evidence, and 
should be able to challenge corporate governance scholars and practitioners to think in new and 
different ways. The perspective articles are intriguing pieces that can be written effectively by 
scholars and practitioners who have been engaged in actual practice of corporate governance. 
Perspective articles are not weak conceptual papers, but rather challenge existing corporate 
governance paradigms and practices in one or more national settings. We do expect to publish at 
least one perspective paper every year as it is very difficult to write a challenging article on 
corporate governance practices and theories. It is so not surprising to find, then, that in 2012, CGIR 
published only one perspective article aimed at challenging the dominant idea that corporate 
governance systems will converge to the Anglo-Saxon model (Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2012). 
(v) Commentaries are short essays focused on a specific topic. Since the special issue on 
executive compensation published in 2012, we started to invite governance scholars with rigorous 
and relevant publications in the specific topic of the special issue to write commentaries aimed at 
taking stock of the research accumulated on that topic, and to highlight future avenues of research. 
We typically invite these scholars to first present their ideas at the developmental workshop where 
working papers submitted to the special issue are presented and discussed, and then to formalize 
their ideas in a short commentary (about 3,000 words) published in the special issue. In this way, 
their insights can help submitting scholars to improve their studies during the review process and 
eventually reach the publication stage in the journal. In sum, commentaries written by reputed 
scholars in the field are another way through which CGIR would like to contribute to the 
development of corporate governance studies and practices. In 2012, CGIR published one 
commentary (Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2012) in the special issue on executive compensation, but 
since then a few commentaries have also been solicited by guest editors in order to enrich the 
contribution of the special issue. 
(vi) Point and counterpoint articles consist of two papers written by different authors that present 
opposing views on a current topic that is being debated in the international corporate governance 
community. Proposals for “point and counterpoint” articles can be advanced by reputed scholars in 
the topic, or can be the result of invitation from the editorial team. We foresee several possibilities 
for point and counterpoint articles on corporate governance, as there are several topics (e.g. 
compensation practices, institutional investors’ role, shareholders’ power and interests, board role 
and effectiveness) where scholars from different disciplines or from different governance systems 
can provide different, and sometimes also opposing, views.  
 
The articles published in this issue touch several important topics and are written using 
different formats. They are an example of how different formats can contribute to enrich the 
dialogue among corporate governance scholars and practitioners.  
The first paper, an empirical study by Fogel, Lee, Lee and Palmberg, investigates the 
influence of foreign investors as actors of change in a national governance system. For this research 
objective, they collected and analyzed longitudinal data (1990-2008) about ownership and voting 
rights of Swedish listed companies. The results show that the acquisition of equity stakes by foreign 
institutional investors did not lead automatically to an increase in the performance of Swedish 
companies. Foreign investors had a positive effect on firm performance only when they acquired a 
critical influence on voting power at the expense of largest domestic shareholders. These findings 
show that corporate governance practices are culturally embedded as controlling shareholders of 
large companies are vested by local values; this explains why the old practices cannot be easily 
changed even if the new ones can produce large efficiency gains. 
 The second paper is a perspective paper on business elites and institutional embeddedness in 
the UK code-issuing process. Haxhi, van Ees and Sorge analyze the UK process behind the issue of 
codes of good governance by focusing on the key actors, their power and their interplay. They argue 
that the “comply-or-explain” principle that is at the base of the UK codes, together with the large 
number of codes issued along the time, is a reflection of the diversity and permissiveness of the UK 
society and shows its ability to absorb contested corporate practices in a way that protect the status 
quo. By exploring the strategic behavior of the UK business elites in response to the pressure to 
reform corporate governance practices, the study offers a political perspective on how the national 
context affects the code-issuing process. As such, the study shows that the development of good 
governance practices cannot be understood without considering the interests and the behavior of 
national elites. 
In the third paper Imke Kappes and Thomas Schmid explore if family firms are more long-
term oriented than non family firms. Building on agency theory, they developed a theoretical 
framework and hypotheses on how family involvement affects the time horizons of companies. 
They test the framework and the related hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset of 701 German 
companies in the period between 1995 and 2009. The results show that family firms experience 
lower time-horizon agency problems than non-family firms, and that this is particularly pronounced 
during periods characterized by an increase in the pressure on short-term performance. These 
findings support the view that family firms differ from other firms, and so the assumptions of 
agency theory should be adapted when applied to this specific context. The study also indicates that 
the utility function of family members, e.g. the concern to satisfy the needs of future generations, 
can strongly affect the decision making at the top, and the long term orientation in particular. 
The last two articles are a point and a counterpoint on the possibility for China to transition 
from relation-based to rule-based governance. The article written by Shaomin Li supports the 
positive thesis, while the article written by Kun Luen Alex Lau and Angus Young is negative about 
the transition. Li’s thesis is based on the view that when the scale of a national economy is small, 
the relation-based governance is an efficient mechanism, while the same governance mechanism 
will become costly and inefficient as economic activity expands. Thus, with an increase in the scale 
of the economy, eventually there will be a shift from relation-based to rule-based governance 
because this is the most efficient mechanism when the scale and scope of the economy is large. 
Rule-based governance needs institutional (i.e. legal and information) infrastructures that are costly 
to develop, but once they are developed, they can provide their services at almost no cost. Also, 
from a social justice theory perspective, the transition is inevitable as a relation-based governance 
system is not equitable. From this perspective, the main obstacle to the transition is not the cultural 
heritage, but the political forces (the government and its officials) that benefit from the relation-
based system. As the relation-based system will limit further economic development and will create 
more inequality, the Chinese officials will be forced to accept the inevitability of the transition to 
the new system. In sum, China’s transition from relation-based to rule-based governance is a 
question of when and how. 
In the related article, Lau and Young develop the opposite thesis. They argue that China will 
not completely transition from a relation-based to a rule-based governance system because of its 
cultural heritage and entrenched value system. China is an ancient civilization and possesses a rich 
cultural heritage with a strong emphasis on reciprocity, trust and mutual obligation. In this cultural 
context, the personal relationships matter a lot and people tend to behave with a long term 
orientation. Moreover, the Chinese governance system is characterized by paternalism and a 
hierarchical structure. This is true in family firms and in state-owned companies, as in both cases it 
is assumed – based on the Confucian normative order – that leaders will act in the best interests of 
the people. In sum, the authors argue that China will not transition from relation-based to rule-based 
governance system because relational governance is deeply entrenched in the Confucian cultural 
roots of China.  
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